"Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation And Expanding Nuclear Energy: Incompatible Or Complementary Goals?" - Summary
The following summary of "Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation and Expanding Nuclear Energy: Incompatible or Complementary Goals?" was drafted by Michael Roston. It has not been approved or reviewed by the panelists.
George Perkovich, vice president for studies, Global Security and Economic Development, and director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace began the session by saying that if there was a need for expanded nuclear energy, new rules and better enforcement to prevent more nuclear weapons proliferation were needed. He added that the problems with the current nonproliferation regime were well known, but the champions of new nuclear power plants seemed to have embraced an historical amnesia, and once again the technology was moving faster than the rules for managing it. He worried that if the current phase of nuclear power expansion carried on without any nonproliferation advances, the Stanley Foundation’s heirs would be holding another conference in 30 years asking what went wrong.
Steven E. Miller, the director of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, said he did not think the sky was falling. But there had been a series of shocks to the nonproliferation regime that had to be juxtaposed against the wide interest around the world to expand or establish ambitious nuclear power programs in countries from Egypt to China. He added that we were entering a world with many more power reactors and, therefore, more nuclear commerce and more fissile material production.
Unfortunately, there had been a slow-motion erosion of confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation safeguards system as a result of problems ranging from the covert programs in Iraq and North Korea, the latent capability Iran was developing, the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology trafficking network, and the US-India nuclear agreement. He proposed a number of steps to improve the safeguards framework, including building up the International Atomic Energy Agency’s institutional capacities, limiting the spread of fissile material production, and internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle.
Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished professor of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, said the “what have you done for us lately?” factor played a powerful role in the current state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Many nonnuclear weapons states believed that the failure of the nuclear weapons states to pursue any serious negotiations working toward disarmament undermined the regime’s credibility. Furthermore, the nonnuclear weapons states considered their right to access peaceful nuclear technology to be a right powerfully enshrined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
He feared that President George W. Bush's proposal outlined in 2004 at the National Defense University to freeze the development of new fissile material production capabilities was the wrong approach because it created a “keep-out zone” against which many friendly nonnuclear weapons states bristled. As an alternative, he suggested that states be permitted to develop new fuel cycle capabilities if they agreed to internationalize them and join the global management and decision-making process that would govern the nuclear fuel cycle around the world. While this system would still have the problems of incorporating Iran and North Korea, it would provide a stronger normative foundation to work with them and help others join the improvement of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Listen to the discussion here
George Perkovich, vice president for studies, Global Security and Economic Development, and director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace began the session by saying that if there was a need for expanded nuclear energy, new rules and better enforcement to prevent more nuclear weapons proliferation were needed. He added that the problems with the current nonproliferation regime were well known, but the champions of new nuclear power plants seemed to have embraced an historical amnesia, and once again the technology was moving faster than the rules for managing it. He worried that if the current phase of nuclear power expansion carried on without any nonproliferation advances, the Stanley Foundation’s heirs would be holding another conference in 30 years asking what went wrong.
Steven E. Miller, the director of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, said he did not think the sky was falling. But there had been a series of shocks to the nonproliferation regime that had to be juxtaposed against the wide interest around the world to expand or establish ambitious nuclear power programs in countries from Egypt to China. He added that we were entering a world with many more power reactors and, therefore, more nuclear commerce and more fissile material production.
Unfortunately, there had been a slow-motion erosion of confidence in the nuclear nonproliferation safeguards system as a result of problems ranging from the covert programs in Iraq and North Korea, the latent capability Iran was developing, the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology trafficking network, and the US-India nuclear agreement. He proposed a number of steps to improve the safeguards framework, including building up the International Atomic Energy Agency’s institutional capacities, limiting the spread of fissile material production, and internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle.
Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished professor of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, said the “what have you done for us lately?” factor played a powerful role in the current state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Many nonnuclear weapons states believed that the failure of the nuclear weapons states to pursue any serious negotiations working toward disarmament undermined the regime’s credibility. Furthermore, the nonnuclear weapons states considered their right to access peaceful nuclear technology to be a right powerfully enshrined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
He feared that President George W. Bush's proposal outlined in 2004 at the National Defense University to freeze the development of new fissile material production capabilities was the wrong approach because it created a “keep-out zone” against which many friendly nonnuclear weapons states bristled. As an alternative, he suggested that states be permitted to develop new fuel cycle capabilities if they agreed to internationalize them and join the global management and decision-making process that would govern the nuclear fuel cycle around the world. While this system would still have the problems of incorporating Iran and North Korea, it would provide a stronger normative foundation to work with them and help others join the improvement of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Listen to the discussion here
posted by CNGS at
7:23 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home