The following summary of "Enforcement of International Norms: Bringing and Keeping Dissenters in the Fold" was drafted by Tony Fleming. It has not been approved or reviewed by the panelists. In discussing the enforcement of international norms, particularly in the bringing and keeping of dissenters within the fold, the speakers looked at enforcement in terms of tradecraft as required for the management of specific cases, and also in a structural approach as to how enforcement related to the international system as a whole.
Bruce Jentleson pointed out the appropriateness of the term "leverage" in the conference title, noting that there is very little even the strongest governments can impose in today’s world. The ability to exert power does not always translate into influence, contrary to the perceived ideology of the Bush administration. We may still be able to do what we want, but getting others to do what we would like them to do is these days is a challenge.
Jentleson cautioned, however, that we cannot lay the blame for this entirely on the Bush administration. Today’s international system is much less hierarchical than it was in the past, and others are much more assertive in their identities and their own policies. That would not be different had Gorebeen inaugurated in 2001 rather than Bush.
But he did suggest we can conclude that the Bush administration has made this situation much worse. During the Cold War, the essence of American leadership was overridingly based on other countries (at least the non-communist ones) benefiting from the United States' pursuit of its own interests. Not everyone saw it that way, but as a general trend, that conclusion is sound. Today, however, most countries do not see United States' pursuit of its best interests necessarily as in their own. There has even been a push back from allies in Europe on whether they want the United States to continue to play a leadership role in international affairs.
US interests are best met and international institutions work best when the United States works through them, but international institutions do not always act as they should or follow up when they should. The United States needs partners in conducting multilateralism, but the world also needs American power to enforce many of the norms resolved through those international institutions.
So what are the best means of enforcing norms against dissenters? Miller noted that enforcement -- bringing into conformity those states in violation of accepted international norms –- is a difficult task and that the international community has not demonstrated a keen ability in doing so. It is not because governments do not care or that they think that the regime is not important. At least in terms of NPT compliance, nonproliferation is at the top of the list of concerns on which the international community is in fundamental agreement.
There are a number of reason why offering inducements (or threatening sanctions) as a means of enforcement is not often a straightforward ability. No country, including the United States, has an unfettered ability to offer carrots or impose sticks, and domestic political interests may frustrate diplomatic interests in offering inducements if such “carrots” are seen as rewarding bad behavior.
Enforcing compliance is especially difficult when ambiguities arise as to where a violation has occurred. When this happens, enforcement action and is much more difficult, as is building a coalition around the need for enforcement. Shore noted that to minimize ambiguities, the enforcement of norms should not be framed as an exercise in global governance or even multilateralism, but more clearly in the context of a rules-based order.
We study military strategy left, right, and sideways, and that’s great, noted Jentleson. But we don’t do that as much with questions on diplomacy. Due in large part to this and a pervasive lack of understanding of other countries’ internal political processes, the more acute crises often happen across an incredibly hostile divide. This makes efforts to build trust, offer inducements, or enter into negotiations all that more difficult.
To some extent, our ability to overcome these obstacles can almost be by accident. In pragmatic terms, if we are build trust, we should reconsider the commonly held wisdom that you need to threaten sticks to make the carrots worth accepting. By suggesting the possibility of regime change, we could be pushing dissenters in the direction that prompted them to break from the norms in the first place.
Both Miller and Jentleson pointed out the that collective action is also challenged when states, even those pursing the same outcomes or at last cooperating, are not prepared to accept the costs associated with enforcement. In this regard, enforcement because particularly difficult when the enforcers themselves have interests that clash with the proposed enforcement measures. Whereas the US desires a tough sanctions resolution from the Security Council on Iran, Russia and China recently signed deals with Iran, undermining a possible consensus. Similarly, China’s oil interest in the Sudan make enforcement action against the genocide there more
complicated. It is not impossible, but will require a flexibility that the Bush administration has been unwilling thus far to employ. On North Korea, China joined in on a unanimous Security Council resolution, provided it was not required to faithfully enforce its more intrusive provisions. This disharmony illustrates that often, the problem of enforcement rests as much with the enforcers as with the dissenters.
Similarly, pursuing enforcement action is also undermined with those engaged in it are perceived as not acting according to the rules themselves. The US action in Iraq proceeded without approval from the Security Council, which many felt was as severe a breach as what the United States often accuses others of. Similarly, the United States was viewed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as acting hypocritically, given that we were ourselves not meeting our obligations under the treaty.
Nonetheless, a commitment to enforcing agreed-upon norms must be made, Shore noted, even when that clashes with either the enforcers interests or with a sacrosanct view of sovereignty that permits dissenters to avoid inspection or criticism. We can be hopeful that in seeing China integrate more fully into the international community, but integration will require they help uphold shared norms. The United Nations needs to mean what it says when it condemns the genocide in Darfur and calls for IAEA inspections in Iran, despite China’s bilateral energy agreements with those countries. This is not just a problem with US policies but with the wider international community and with the invocation of sovereignty when dissenters violate international norms.
Multilateral desirability does not always match up with multilateral feasibility. Miller noted for instance that, within the NPT regime, there is no clear mandate for anyone to act in the face of obvious non-compliance. So the question remains, when dissenters violate agreed-upon international norms, who should act and what should they do?
Jentleson drew on lessons learned from Libya’s concession of a nuclear weapons program that, while not applicable in all cases, could provide guidance in enforcing international norms generally. The first lesson is to recognize a need to balance force with diplomacy. The Bush administration claimed that the Libyan decision was prompted by the Iraqi invasion when in fact it was a process that began under the Clinton administration with strong leadership from the United Kingdom.
Secondly, enforcement should be based in policy change rather than threats of regime change. If dissenters are convinced that giving up weapons program will render them more vulnerable to invasion and ouster, they resist. But if security reassurances are in place and regime change off the table, enforcing norm compliance is much more achieveable.
Lastly, Jentleson reminds us that it is important to know the other side. Quadafi faced a challenge not only from the outside international community, but from with in terms of the Libyan economy and growing presence of Al Qaeda within the country. We have done a poor job of understanding the role of nationalism, particularly in the developing world. During the Cold War, everything was about communism; today it is about jihadism. An understanding of domestic and internal interests is missing from the discourse. In this regard, one area which needs further exploration is that of elites within dissenter governments. To the extent they see their interests promoted by resisting the pressures of the international community, the elites will support resistance. However, where their interests, as business leaders for example, are promoted by compliance with international norms, they can serve to convince leaders to cooperate.
Likewise, Miller suggested a number of important options for enforcers, particularly the United States, to keep in mind. Enforcement of norms against a government does not require a full disengagement of relations with that government. Deep and persuasive mistrust is an effective barrier. The United States should remain willing to engage without being viewed as caving in to the other side. On the other hand, we need to think about a division of labor -- recognizing as we have in part with Iran -- that it may not always be the United States that can best deliver. This approach should be complemented by a willingness to reward other enforcers. Comprehensively, the United States should recognize that there may be a beneficial trade-off between its maximum objective and feasible results; if we insist on not budging, we risk dissenters moving ahead in their noncompliance.
Listen to the discussion here.
